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BILLS AND NOTES-Accom-AODATION MAKER-EXTENSION OF TImE OF
PAYMENT-EFFECT.-CowAN V. RAMSEY, 140 PAC. (ARiz.) 5OI.-Held,
that where the payee of note who has knowledge that the defendant maker
signed merely for the accommodation of the other party, and the payee
enters into a binding agreement for an extension of time with the other
party, the accommodation maker is not thereby discharged.
Before the passage of the Negotiable Instruments Law, one who made
a promissory note for the accommodation of another was, as between the
parties, a surety. The holder, who had knowledge of the true relation
of the parties, was bound to act towards such accommodation maker as
toward a surety in order to preserve his rights against him. Under such
circumstances an extension of time to the person ultimately liable, without
the consent of the surety, that is, the accommodation maker, released the
latter. Guild v. Butter, 127 Mass. 386; Barron v. Cady, 40 Mich. 259;
Wright v. Bartlett, 43 N. H. 548; Bank v. Walter, 1O4 Tenn. i. There
were, however, a few early cases which held, as a result of the influence
of Lord Mansfield's decision in the case of Fentum v. Pocock, 5 Taunton
192, that the accommodation acceptor or maker is the party ultimately and
primarily liable, regardless of any knowledge the payee or holder might
have. Wilson v. Isbell, 45 Ala. 142; Cronise v. Kellogg, 2o Ill. ii;
Anderson v. Anderson, 4 Dana (Ky.) 352. This was the minority view.
The principal case rests on the ground that the Negotiable Instruments
Law has changed the prevailing common law so as to make the accommo-
dation maker or acceptor primarily and not secondarily liable. If this
is true there is no escape from the conclusion of the court. The courts
have almost unanimously taken this view in the few cases so far adjudi-
cated. Vanderford v. Farmers, etc., Nat. Bank, lO5 Md. 164, 66 Atl.
47; Cellers v. Lyons, 49 Oreg. 186, 89 Pac. 426; Waestenholme v. Smith,
34 Utah 300, 97 Pac. 329; Bradley Engineering & Mfg. Co. v. Hey-
burn, 56 Wash. 628, Io6 Pac. 170; National Citizens Bank v. Toplitz,
81 App. Div. 593, 71 N. E. I; Richards v. Market Exch. Bank Co.,
81 Ohio St. 348, 90 N. E. iooo; Fritts v. Kirchdorfer, 136 Ky. 643,
124 S. W. 882; Union Trust Co. v. McGinty, 212 Mass. 205, 98 N. E.
679; Murphy v. Panter, 125 Pac. (Oreg.) 292; Lumberman's Nat. Bank
v. Campbell, 121 Pac. (Oreg.) 427. The Iowa Court is the only one
which has taken a contrary view. Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Snouffer, 139
Iowa 176, 117 N. W. 5o. In the case of Collers v. Lyons, supra, the
court maintained this view notwithstanding the fact that the word
"surety" was placed after the accommodation maker's signature. The
decision in this case has been criticized because it did not consider a pro-
vision of the act that "a person placing his signature upon an instru-
ment otherwise than as maker, drawer or acceptor is deemed to be an
indorser, unless he clearly indicates by appropriate words his intention to
be bound in some other capacity." Whatever views one may entertain
about the correctness of the decision in the principal case on principle,
it is certain that it is entirely in accord with the well. considered cases.
COMMERCE-STATE REGULATION-CONGRESSIONAL INACTION-RATEs FOR
INTER-STATE FERRIAGE.-PORT RICHMOND AND BERGEN POINT FERRY Co.
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V. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF THE COUNTY OF HUDSON, 34 SuP.
CT. R. 82i.-The Ferry Co. was incorporated by act of the New York legis-
lature to maintain a ferry across the Kill von Kull from Port Richmond,
Staten Island, N. Y., to Bergen Point, Hudson Co., N. J. By an act
passed in 1799 the New Jersey legislature had given the Board of Free-
holders power to fix the rates of ferriage from Hudson County to New
York. The plaintiff in error contends that this act was repugnant to
the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. Held, that a state may
fix reasonable rates of ferriage from its shores to the shores of another
state over a boundary stream until Congress undertakes to regulate such
rates.
The Federal Constitution provides that "The Congress shall have the
power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
states, and with the Indian tribes." Art. i, Sec. 8. Ferries over waters
separating the states cannot be deemed beyond the control of Congress
under this power. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196.
But the states are not expressly excluded from exercising control over
such commerce and if they are excluded it must be because of the nature
of the power requires that the authority should not reside in the states.
Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35; Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122.
In considering the nature of the power the thing to look at is the
subject of the power, as no rule can be laid down for the power as a
whole. Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Philadelphia et al., 12 How.
299. Where the subjects are so national in their nature as to admit
of only one uniform system of regulation the power over them is
exclusive in Congress. Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S.
691. But where the subject of the commerce power is local and limited
in its nature and sphere of operation the states may prescribe regula-
tions until Congress interferes and assumes control. Gloucester Ferry
Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra. As where Congress hasn't regulated wharf-
age charges the states may do so. Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg,
supra. Congressional inaction on such subjects of a local nature is to
be deemed a declaration that for the time being and until Congress
acts the states may regulate. City of Mobile v. Kimball, io2 U. S. 691.
From the earliest times the states have regulated ferries and they can
more advantageously do so, as they are of a purely local nature.
Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra. But the states must not
place any burdens upon inter-state commerce. Transportation Co. v.
Parkersburg, supra. A reasonable charge however is in no sense a
burden on such commerce. City of Mobile v. Kimball, supra; Gloucester
Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra. In the principal case the charges were
found to be reasonable and the cases seem all agreed that this is the
only limitation on state authority in the absence of Congressional action.
EQUITY-SUIT TO REMOVE CLOUD ON TITLE.-LouIsVILLE & NASHVILLE
R. R. V. WESTERN UNION TEL. CO., 34 SUPREME COURT REPORTER, 81o.-
Held, that a bill in equity will lie to remove a cloud on title, where
both parties are non-resident, and where, under local law as construed
by the state courts, the rightful owner of real property within the state
may maintain a suit to dispel a cloud cast upon his title, even though
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the instrument is void on its face. (Though this case is decided in the
Federal Court, it is decided in accordance with the state law of
Mississippi, and it is the point of state law which is here under
consideration.)
The general rule of equity is that a court of equity will not entertain
a suit to remove a cloud on title, cast by an instrument void on its face.
Washburn v. Burnham, 63 N. Y. 132; Patterson v. Simpson, 145 Ala.
685. But there are some courts which hold contra to this, even though
the deed is void on its face. See Bishop v. Moorman, 98 Ind. I; 3
Pomeroy's Equity, sec. 1399; Day Co. v. State, 68 Tex. 527; Mount v.
McAulay, 83 Pa. 529. Many courts hold, under statutes, that a bill will
lie to remove a cloud on title, even though the instrument or deed be
void on its face. Kittle v. Bellegarde, 86 Cal. 556; Simmons v. Carlton,
44 Fla. 719. So, too, if the deed is made a prima facie case for defen-
dant, by an Act, though the deed is void on its face. Scott v. Onderdonk,
14 N. Y. 9.
EVIDENCE-PAROL-WRITTEN CONTRACT.-RIUTHERFORD v. HOLBERT. 142
PAc. (OKLA.) 1099. When a written contract of sale has an express
condition precedent, held, other conditions precedent may be shown by
parol evidence.
The earliest case we have establishing that the terms of a written con-
tract may not be varied by parol evidence is that of a sealed instrument.
Bresslau, 546: "There is therefore no counterproof allowable against the
statements of fact in a sealed document." This doctrine soon spread,
until in 41 Edw. III, as Justice Holmes (Common Law, p. 262) says,
"If a man said he was bound, he was bound." (Of course evidence of
fraud was admissible; in 1371 (Y. B. 44 Ass. 3O) a man escaped liability
on a sealed instrument by showing that it had been incorrectly read to
him.) This is the law to-day, of contracts in general. Tripp v. Smith,
i68 N. Y. 655; Merrigan v. Hall, 175 Mass. 5o8; Tuttle v. Burgett, 53
Ohio St. 498; Booth v. Hosckins, 75 Cal. 271; as well as of contracts
of sale; New Idea Pattern Co. v. Whelan, 75 Conn. 455; Tichenor v.
Newman, i86 Ill. 264; Fry v. National Glass Co., 207 Pa. St. 505. How-
ever, the distinction between integral parts of a contract and conditions
precedent to the existence of a contract should be noted carefully. This
was recognized as early as 1292. Anon. Yr. Bk. 2o Edw. I. 258 (Hor-
wood's Ed.), in which evidence was admitted as showing that a claimant
to land under a written contract had not satisfied an oral condition
precedent made at the time of writing. Some jurisdictions have not
appreciated the importance of the distinction. Findley v. Means, 71 Ark.
289; Chattanooga, Rome and Columbus R. R. Co. v. Warthen, 98 Ga.
599; Beard v. Boylan, 59 Conn. I81. But we find that the principal case
is in accord with the majority of holdings on this point. Pyre v. Camp-
bell, 6 E. & B. 370; Wilson v. Powers, 131 Mass. 539; Musser v. Mus-
"ser, 92 Neb. 387; Alexander v. Righter, 240 Pa. 22.
GAMBLING SLOT MACIIINES-SUMMARY SEIZURE AS A MEASURE OF PRE-
VENTATIVE JUSTICF-SoPER ET AL. V. MIcHAL, 9I ATL. (MD.) 684. In an
action of replevin to recover from the police commissioners of Baltimore
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ninety-eight "slot machines" and other apparatus, all of them devices
adapted to gambling purposes and some "at the time of seizure . . . sus-
ceptible of no other use," held, that a police officer cannot as a measure of
preventative justice, seize summarily articles adapted to an illegal use,
unless the owner be under criminal prosecution or accusation in connection
therewith.
Summary seizure of goods adapted to an illegal use has been unhesi-
tatingly sustained for use as evidence in a criminal prosecution. Knee-
land v. Connally, 70 Ga. 424; People v. Hess, 85 Mich. 128. It has also
been upheld under statutory authorization as an incident to criminal
proceedings for the suppression of certain crimes. Woods v. Cottrell,
55 W. Va. 476; Early v. People, 117 Ill. App. 6o8. It is sometimes sus-
tained purely as a measure of preventative justice. State v. O'Neill, 58
Vt. 163 (intoxicating liquors); Police Commissioners v. Wagner, 93
Md. i9o (slot machines); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133 (fishing nets
unlawfully employed); Osborn v. Charlevoix Circuit Judge, ix4 Mich.
655 (fishing net). Some courts have proceeded upon the theory of goods
mala in se, from which the law withholds all protection. Spalding v.
Preston, 21 Vt. 9 (counterfeit money) ; Robertson v. Porter, i Ga. App.
223 (gambling apparatus which could not conceivably be used for any
lawful purpose). Goods of doubtful criminality may never be seized
summarily upon the two grounds last mentioned. Wagner v. Upshur, 95
Md. 519. Evidence which uncontradicted would amount to proof must
be forthcoming prior to the seizure. Mason v. Lothrop, 7 Gray (Mass.)
354. A statutory requirement of less than this would be an unconstitu-
tional deprivation of property without due process of law. Darst v.
People, 51 Ill. 286. If goods are summarily seized in doubtful cases, it
is no defense to show the actual guilt of the plaintiff in replevin. Wag-
ner v. Upshur, supra; Averill v. Chadwick, 153 Mass. 7i. The princi-
pal case is within the severe language of Spalding v. Preston and Rob-
ertson v. Porter, supra. It is distinguished, however, by one important
fact, the absence of any evidence of the owner's actual or intended breach
of any law. The cases cited establish the necessity that the goods seized
be obviously and intrinsically adapted to an unlawful purpose. The
principal case adds, consistently and properly, with a view to the pro-
tection of an innocent proprietor, that this is not enough, without evidence
that the person upon whom the loss is to fall is privy to the illegal
practice.
INsURANcE-ACCIDENT-DEATH INDUCED BY MENTAL SHOCK.-INTER-
NATIONAL TRAvELERs' Ass'N. v. BRANUM, 169 S. W. (TEx.) 389.-Held,
that death from apoplexy caused from the shock and excitement of seeing
a helpless man accidentally burned to death is a death caused by accidental
means within the terms of an accident certificate, and not from disease.
An accident has been defined as an event taking place without expecta-
tion or foresight. Schmid v. Indiana Travelers' Acc. Ass'n., 42 Ind. App.
483; U. S. Mut. Acc. Ass'n. v. Barry, i31 U. S. ioo; Ludwig v'. Pre-
ferred Acc. Ins. Co. of N. Y., 113 Minn. 510. It must be without the
aid and design of the person. Paul v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 112 N. Y. 472;
N. W. Corn. Travelers Ass'n. v. London Guarantee & Acc. Co., io Mani-
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toba L. Rep. 537. Although one is so afflicted with disease that he will
die from it shortly yet if by accidental means he dies sooner of the dis-
ease it is a death by accident. Hooper v. Standard Life and Acc. Ins.
Co., 148 S. W. (Mo.) 116. Death from apoplexy caused by physical
shock such as a fall is within an accident policy. Hall v. Am. Masonic
Acc. Ass'n. 86 Wis. 518; Nat. Benevolent Assn. v. Gramnan, 107 Ind.
288. One English decision has held that inability to work caused by
mental shock from an impending train accident came within a clause
in an insurance policy, "in case of his being incapacitated from employ-
ment by reason of accident." Pugh v. The London Brighton & South
Coast Ry. Co., L. R. 2, Q. B. D. 248. Tort actions for damages for
injuries caused by mental suffering are distinguished. Pugh v. Ry. Co.
(supra), citing Victorian Rys. Commissioners v. Coultas, 13 App.
Cas. 222.
INSURANcE-AcTIONS ON POLICY-WAIER.-CRANSTON V. WEST COAST
Ln E INSURANCE Co., 142 PAC. (OR.) 762. Held, where a policy con-
tains a condition that it shall not go into effect until the policy is
delivered and the first premium is paid and that no agent has power to
modify this provision, the insurer waives the condition of the policy,
where the agent, without express authority, delivers the policy and
accepts as payment the note of the insured.
Where the agent is intrusted with a policy for the purpose of delivery,
and does deliver it, though in violation of a provision of the policy as
to payment, it has been held that the assured has a right to assume that
prepayment has been waived. Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 45 Iowa
377; Boehen v. Williamsburgh City Ins. Co., 35 N. Y. 131; Bodine v.
Exchange Fire Ins. Co., 51 N. Y. 117; Contra, Russell v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 176 N. Y. 178. Haight, J., dissenting. The theory seems to be that
by giving the policy to an agent for delivery and the delivery by the agent,
without payment of the first premium by the insured, the insurer has
conferred authority on the agent to waive that provision of the policy.
The case accords with the weight of authority.
NEGLIGENCE-INJURY-PROXIIIATE CAUSE.-NiRDLINGER v. Ald. DIsTRICT
TELEGRAPH Co., 9i ATL. (PA.) 883.-Held, where the injury follows
directly from the negligence, and might or ought to have been foreseen
by the defendant as likely to result from his act, there the negligence is
the proximate cause of the injury.
The court here uses the test of foresight to determine the proximate
cause. In general, a wrong-doer is responsible for the natural and proxi-
mate consequences of his misconduct. Ehrgott v. Mayor etc. of the City
of New York, 96 N. Y. 264. On the question of negligence, it is
material to consider what a prudent man might reasonably have antici-
pated; but when negligence is once established, that consideration is
entirely immaterial on the question of how far that negligence imposes
liability. Isham v. Dow's Estate, 70 Vt. 588. When negligence is estab-
lished, change in condition may'carry the result of the negligence further
than it would otherwise have gone, and yet liability attach for the conse-
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quent injuries although entirely unforeseen. Ide v. Boston & Maine Ry.,
83 Vt. 66. The person guilty of the negligent act will not be excused
for the reason that the particular consequences were unusual and could
not ordinarily be foreseen. Graney et ux. v. St. L., L M., & S. Ry. Co.,
i4o Mo. 89; Ala. G. S. Ry. Co. v. Chapman, 8o Ala. 615; Schumaker
v. St. P. & D. Ry. Co., 46 Minn. 39; Hubbard v. Bartholomew, I44
N. W. 13; Heiting v. C., R. I., & P. Co., 229 Ill. 39o. The injurious,
proximate, and natural consequences of an act of negligence are always
deemed to be foreseen. El Paso S. W. Ry. Co. v. Barrett, ioi S. W.
1025. This mode of stating the law (as supra) is misleading, if not
positively inaccurate. It confounds and mixes the definition of negli-
gence with that of proximate cause. What a man may reasonably antici-
pate is important, and may be decisive in determining whether an act is
negligent, but is not at all decisive in determining whether that act is the
proximate cause of an injury which ensues. Hudson v. Ry., 142 N. C.
198; Smith v. London & S. W. Ry. Co., L. R., 6 C. P. I4. The negli-
gence is the proximate cause if, after the injury is complete the injury
appears to have been a natural and probable consequence of it. Fish-
burn v. Ry. Co., 127 Iowa 492; Marsh v. Paper Co., 1O Me. 89; Hill
v. Winsor, 118 Mass. 251. In a word, the proper test of negligence is
foresight, but of proximate cause is hindsight.
REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS-MUTUAL MISTAiE-EQUITABLE RELIEF.-
PARCHEN V. CHESSMAN, 142 PAC. (MONT.) 63I.-Held, Reformation
will be granted, where, through the mistake of a scrivener, terms are
inserted in a negotiable note not in accord with the actual agreement and
the fact that the plaintiff may have been negligent in signing it without
reading it is not in itself sufficient ground for denial of relief.
Many of the books declare that no relief can be had under such
circumstances. 2 Herman on Estoppel and Res Judicata, sec. 1004; I
Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, sec. 849; I Page on Contracts, sec. 76.
So in this same jurisdiction it was held freedom from negligence is a
condition precedent to relief. American Min. Co. v. Bos. Mil. Co., Mont.
476. And the same view was taken in Hennessey v. Hohnes et al., 46
Mont. 89, Brantly, J., the author of this opinion, concurring. So in
Grieve v. Grieve, 15 Wyo. 358; Met. Loan Ass. v. Esche, 75 Cal. 513;
Snelgrove v. Earl, 17 Utah 321; Reed v. Coughran, 21 S. D. 257. In
Ackerman v. Begrish, 5o At. 673, no reformation was allowed, though
in that case the party seeking reformation was trying to enforce a "hard
bargain." Negligence will not deprive a party of his remedy if there be
fraud. Ward v. Spelts & Klosterman, 39 Nebr. 8o9; Hitchins v. Pettingill,
58 N. H. 3, Contra; Moorman v. Collier, 32 Iowa 138. But where the
party has been slow to ask for reformation he can have no remedy. Van
Houten v. Van Houten, 68 N. J. Eq. 358; Mills v. Lockwood, 42 Ill.
iii, Contra. In Cole & Hart v. Williams, 12 Nebr. 440, it was held
fraudulent to attempt to enforce a writing executed by mutual mistake.
In any cases of reformation the evidence must clearly show what the
intended agreement was. Strong v. Ganmell, 68 Nebr. 709. If this does
appear there is authority that reformation may be had. Wernerv. Rawson,
89 Ga. 619; Smith v. Wakeman, 114 Mich. 61I; Newland v. First
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Baptist Church of Bellevue, 137 Mich. 335. The principal case is in
harmony with this modern tendency to grant relief when refusal would
be harsh and inequitable and when the intent of the parties can be
clearly shown.
SALEs-BREACH OF WARRANTY-PRESUMmoN.-FINK v. MARR, 142
PAC. (WAsH.) 482. Failure of the buyer to complain of the quality of
the goods when their inferiority was discovered or within a reasonable
time thereafter raises a presumption of FACT that the complaint of defec-
tive quality is unfounded.
Where the vendee retains possession of the goods and fails to give
notice of defects or to return them, the presumption of LAW is that he
has waived his objections and. has no cause of action. Wells v. Sher-
wood, 6I Barb. (N. Y.) 238; Tilley et al. v. 'The Enterprise Stone Co.,
127 Ill. 457. There is a tendency by some of the courts to sustain the
holding of the principal case. See Ash v. Beck, 68 S. W. (Texas) 53,
also Babcock v. Trice, I8 Ill. 420. The weight of authority at present
is adverse to the holding of the principal case.
WILLS-CONTEST-BURDEN OF PROoF.-HE1UNG ET AL. V. WATSON, 105
N. E., goo (IND.).-Held, that where probate of a will is resisted on
the grounds that the maker was of unsound mind and that the will was
not duly executed, the burden of proving due execution and testamentary
capacity is on the -proponents of the will. Cox, C. J., and Erwin, J.,
dissenting.
The principal case follows the rule laid down in several previous deci-
sions in this jurisdiction. Steinkuehler v. Wempner, 169 Ind. 154; McRey-
nolds v. Smith, 172 Ind. 336. But the law in Indiana was formerly differ-
ent, then placing the burden of proof on the contestants alleging absence
of due execution or want of testamentary capacity. Blough v. Parry,
144 Ind. 463; Teegarden v. Lewis, 145 Ind. 98. Many other states have
the doctrine set forth in the principal case. Barber's Appeal from Pro-
bate, 63 Conn. 393; In re Hoyles' Estate, 162 Mich. 275; Fulton v.
Umbehend, 182 Mass. 487. There is, however, an entire divergence of
opinion on the point, and about an equal number of jurisdictions place
the burden of proof on the contestants. Goldthorpe v. Goldthorpe, 115
Ia. 43o; Matter of Preston, 113 N. Y. App. 732; McNitt's Estate, 229
Pa. 71. In practically all jurisdictions there is a presumption in favor
of the validity of the will, which enables the proponent to make out a
prima facie case by proving the due execution of the will. Likewise, then,
all these courts place upon the contestant the burden of going forward
with evidence to overcome the presumption of validity which the law
makes. By the former Indiana rule the proponent by establishing his
prima facie case also throws the burden of proof upon the contestant,
where it remains throughout the trial. Under the doctrine of the prin-
cipal case the burden of proof is always on the proponent but the pre-
sumption of validity which the law makes weighs in his favor throughout.
